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Abstract
The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the geological repository at Olkiluoto was
accepted be the local municipality, State authorities, and finally endorsed by the Parlia-
ment of Finland in 2001. The site investigations are proceeding to the underground phase
in 2004 when the excavation of the tunnel system for bedrock characterisation at the
repository site begins. The nuclear licensing procedure is scheduled to take place in 2010–
2012, after the geological investigations have reached the target depths and the lay-out
plan for the repository is developed and assessed. Referring to the recommendations
generated in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Programme for Development of
Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories, the safeguards
approach for this pre-operational phase at Olkiluoto site is suggested. At the present
phase the main obligation is to be ensured about the absence of undeclared activities at or
near the repository and during the excavation of the investigatory galleries and the
verification of the excavated rock space and its geometrical volume. The influence of the
excavation activities will be verified against the baseline information collected by the
operational company responsible for the disposal during the site investigations.
In order to identify the site-specific safeguards needs, the national expert group evaluated
the IAEA recommendations and implemented the National System to safeguard the
repository site at Olkiluoto. Because underground excavation works in the hard crystalline
rock of Olkiluoto must be carried out using drilling methods, the safeguards-relevant
monitoring is proposed to be focused on mining-related activities. The passive seismic
monitoring and satellite imagery techniques are suggested for these purposes. Both
methods give indications on the activities near or at the repository as shown in the base-
line data collected by the National System in 2002–2004. In addition, the hydrological
monitoring near the site is also supposed to give signals as unexpected changes in water
pressure or chemistry due to unknown openings in the rock volume. However, these
remote sensing methods are insensitive to the amount of rock volume excavated or to the
volume underground space developed. Therefore, the design information generation and
verification for safeguards purposes should be incorporated to the progress in tunnelling
and to the geological mapping of the tunnel walls in the subsurface before the walls are
possibly reinforced using spray concrete or other techniques that will prevent the rock
wall inspection and verification activities afterwards.
OKKO Olli, RAUTJÄRVI Juha. Safeguards for the geological repository at Olkiluoto in the
pre-operational phase. Final report on Task FINSP C 01374 of the Member States’ Support
Programme to IAEA Safeguards. STUK-YTO-TR 208. Helsinki 2004. 30 pp.
Keywords: safeguards, underground repository, seismic monitoring,
satellite imagery, design information verification
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Preface
The Finnish Support Programme for the IAEA safeguards has undertaken tasks aimed at
developing efficient safeguards concepts and techniques for the final disposal of spent fuel
at the projected facility in Olkiluoto, Finland. The Task FIN A 1184 concerning the prelim-
inary concept for safeguarding spent fuel encapsulation plant in Olkiluoto has been
reported earlier as STUK-YTO-TR 187 / June 2002.
This report provides the results of the Task FIN C 1374. Due to the complex nature of the
subject matter, the task outline had to be revised in order to maintain focus on the current
needs arising from the necessities to implement appropriate measures at the underground
research phase at the proposed repository location, and to establish and maintain the
knowledge base enabling efficient safeguards at the final repository itself.
These efforts of the Finnish Support programme are understood to contribute directly to
the IAEA Research and Development Programme for Nuclear Verification 2004/5 and
particularly to the objectives set for in its Project SGCP-03. This report is generated
parallel with the progress of the Programme for Development of Safeguards for Final
Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories, Task JNT C 1204. This Finnish Task
contributes to the establishment of functional, non-intrusive, and cost-effective site-
specific safeguards measures applicable at the geological circumstances at Olkiluoto,
Finland.
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1 IntroductionFinal disposal of spent fuel and other nuclear ma-
terials may occur in geological repositories at
depths of 250–1000 meters below ground level.
The operational life of a repository is expected to
be 20–100 years before it is closed, backfilled, and
sealed. The repository plans in Finland are to dis-
pose 2600–2700 tons of spent fuel the 40–50 years
of service of four reactors at Olkiluoto and Loviisa
power plants in crystalline rock at a depth of 300–
500 m near the Olkiluoto facilities. In addition, it
will considered that during the operational phase
the underground disposal facilities are to be en-
larged to dispose also the spent fuel of the future
reactors. The approximated spent fuel from the
planned third reactor at Olkiluoto will raise the
present estimate up to 5800 tons after the 60 years
of the service.
Facilities for the final disposal of spent fuel,
though still in the planning stages, are being
designed and submitted for licensing approval in
several countries. Site characterisation activities
are being conducted and exploratory facilities are
being excavated. The United States (U.S.) explora-
tory facility at Yucca Mountain is complete and
will become the main tunnel of the U.S. repository
when the facility is licensed. Belgium, Switzer-
land, France, Germany, Canada and Sweden have
excavated underground laboratories to confirm
their repository concepts. In Finland, the proposed
underground investigation gallery may become
part of the final repository. Finland designated the
Olkiluoto site for its national geological repository
in May 2001; whereas, the United States designat-
ed the Yucca Mountain site as its repository in
July 2002. Sweden is expected to designate its
repository location in 2006. The U.S. repository is
scheduled to begin operation in 2010, Sweden in
2017, and Finland in 2020.
The Finnish Government set the guidelines for
the long-term policy of nuclear waste manage-ment in Finland in 1983. In particular, the deci-
sion was to guide to preparations towards the
direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a geological
repository in case it was not reprocessed. The step-
wise process is outlined in Figure 1. The early
programme was focused on site selection to be
carried out by the generators of spent nuclear fuel.
After the comparison the several sites, the Olkiluo-
to site was considered to represent typical Finnish
bedrock and an application to site the final dispos-
al repository in the Olkiluoto area was made. This
was accepted by the local municipality, the author-
ities, and finally endorsed by the Parliament. After
the Decision-in-Principle the Implementer (Posiva
Oy, owned by the power companies) has focused
the site-specific investigations in Olkiluoto. In
addition to the geological borehole investigations,
an underground tunnel system is planned to be
excavated in the Olkiluoto research site for the
rock characterization purposes. These tunnels may
by linked to form a part of the final repository, in
case the investigation confirm this to be the ac-
ceptable solution.
The Finnish implementer was licensed for the
excavation of the underground research laborato-
ry in 2003 by the local municipality of Eurajoki.
Preliminary works have already begun, and the
excavation will begin in 2004. Since no nuclear
material is planned to be transferred into this
research laboratory during the research phase of
about 6–8 years, the national Nuclear Energy Act
is not applied in the municipal licensing proce-
dure, although the Radiation and Safety Authority
(STUK) reviewed the application. In general, the
implementing company has openly informed the
authorities about its site characterization and
research plans. Owing to this principle of trans-
parency, the main drawings and a scientific moni-
toring programme are also published (Posiva
2003). Therefore, this geological, hydrogeological7
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gramme can also be evaluated by the authorities
and be applied as a part of the safeguards meas-
ures. Moreover, in order to facilitate the licensing
procedure of the final disposal facility, STUK has
initiated safeguards measures to be applied dur-
ing the construction period. The procedure is fo-
cused to fulfill the DIV requirements described in
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Policy
Paper 15 (IAEA, 1997). The Policy Paper, derived
from the work of the IAEA SAGOR (Safeguards
for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological
Repositories) Working Group, is generic guideline
for safeguarding geological repositories. Therefore,
the generic approach must be applied taking in to8
Figure 1. Major events in the programme for disposal of s
1983 Screening of candidates for s
1986 Evaluation by authorities 
1987–  Preliminary site investigations
1992– 94 Reporting and review by auth
1993–  Detailed site investigations (3
1996–97 Interim Reporting and review
1997 Detailed site investigations co
1999 Application for DiP and propo
1999–2001  Review by authorities; decisio
  ratification by Parliament May
2000–2002  Planning of site confirmation 
2003– Review of plans by authoritie
2004– Underground rock characteris
2006– Interim Reporting and review
2010–12 Application for construction l
2011–14  Review of the application and
Starting point for the construc
2020  Application for operating lice
2021 Review of application and dec
Starting point for final disposaccount the local geological features, facility con-
cept, excavation and research activities, and the
existing legislation.
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operational and operational phases, and likely
during the post-closure phase, to confirm the as-
sumptions that
1. the repository is operated safely and will effec-
tively isolate the spent fuel from the biosphere,
and
2. the contained nuclear materials are not divert-
ed to nuclear explosives or unknown purposes.Discussions on the site-specific approaches have
been initiated after the publication of the generic
work of the SAGOR Group, particularly during
the last meetings of the Group, in Oskarshamn
2002 and in Rauma 2003. This Finnish Task C
01374 presents the national approach to establish
the site-specific safeguards approach, also applica-
ble to other organisations.9
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2 The IAEA safeguards for
geological repositoriesThe objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely
detection of diversion of significant quantities of
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or for purposes un-
known, and deterrence of such diversion by the
risk of early detection (INFCIRC/153) and to pro-
vide credible assurance of the absence of unde-
clared nuclear materials and activities in a State
(INFCIRC/540). The IAEA is entrusted for con-
ducting independent verification activities to pro-
vide assurance of the nondiversion of nuclear ma-
terial from declared activities and of the absence
of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. The
safeguards objective as applied to an operating
repository is to provide a high level of assurance
that the quantity of nuclear material contained in
the spent fuel declared to be transferred into a
repository is transferred into the repository and
that undeclared removal of nuclear material
would be detected. The safeguards objective as ap-
plied to the post-closure phase is to provide a high
level of assurance that an undeclared breaching of
integrity of a repository is detected and that conti-
nuity of knowledge of the nuclear material content
of the repository is not lost because of a safeguards
system failure.
A geological repository is a unique facility type
for the perspective of international safeguards
because of its construction into the bedrock, the
long construction period, and the continuing safe-
guards requirement after facility closure. Because
of these, the IAEA should recognize that different
design information generation and verification
time schedules apply than have typically been
used when applying safeguards to surface facili-
ties.
In comparison to above-ground facilities, at
which the IAEA has experience verifying design
information and implementing safeguards moni-10toring and verification measures, sub-surface geo-
logical repository safeguards present unique chal-
lenges. First, the space, into which the repository
will be constructed and the underground areas
contiguous to the boundaries of the repository,
cannot be directly observed. Second, once em-
placed, the IAEA will no longer be able to reverify
the inventory of nuclear material contained in the
repository because of the backfilling of the em-
placement drifts. Thus, should continuity of knowl-
edge of the nuclear material content of the reposi-
tory be lost, that knowledge cannot be restored.
Geological disposal facilities will be developed
over a period of at least a few decades. Key
decisions, e.g. on the disposal concept, siting, de-
sign, operational management and closure, are
expected to be made in a series of steps. Decisions
will be made based on the information available at
each step and the confidence that can be placed in
that information. The step-by-step approach also
allows opportunities for independent technical re-
views, regulatory reviews, and political and public
involvement. Decisions on the need for continued
monitoring could be made by future generations.
However, before the start of construction, during
emplacement and at closure, the understanding
must be sufficient to support the safety and safe-
guards case that satisfies the applicable regulato-
ry requirements.
In 1988, the IAEA held its first Advisory Group
meeting to address safeguards for the final dispos-
al of spent fuel in geological repositories. The
IAEA’s Programme for the Development of Safe-
guards Approaches for the Final Disposal of Spent
Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR) was be-
gun in 1994 and, in 1998, provided recommenda-
tions to the IAEA on generic safeguards approach-
es for spent fuel conditioning facilities and for
operating and closed geological repositories. Nine
Member States and two international organiza-
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8tions contributed to the SAGOR Programme rec-
ommendations.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Policy Se-
ries Number 15, dated June 1997, states the
following policies, among others, with respect to
geological repository safeguards:
“3.1.1 Spent fuel disposed in geological repositor-
ies is subject to safeguards in accordance with
the applicable safeguards requirements. Safe-
guards for such material are maintained after
the repository has been back-filled and sealed,
and for as long as the safeguards agreement
remains in force. The safeguards applied should
provide a credible assurance of non-diversion.
“3.1.2 The safeguards system for such a reposi-
tory should be based on: verification of design
information during design, construction, and
operation; verification of receipts and flow that
no nuclear material is removed by any declared
or undeclared access routes; and maintenance
of continuity of knowledge on the nuclear ma-
terial content.”
“3.1.4 Safeguards requirements should be inte-
grated into the repository design at an early
stage in order to establish functional, non-
intrusive, and cost-effective safeguards meas-
ures. Consultations between the State and the
IAEA should, therefore, start at an early stage
to agree on the safeguards measures in the
repository.”
“3.1.7 The State should provide the following
information as early as possible:
• draft plans of a geological repository site;
…
• description of intended exploratory under-
ground works for the geological repository;
…
• information on existing local mines; and
• any other information that might be iden-
tified by the IAEA as relevant for the
purpose of safeguards.“3.3.1.2 The Agency, in collaboration with the
State, should establish all pertinent informa-
tion about the original undisturbed site (i.e.,
zero-point checking), preferably before excava-
tion begins, in order to plan for safeguards
measures.”
Monitoring will be required during each step of
disposal facility development. Purposes may in-
clude providing baseline information for later as-
sessments, assurance of operational safety and fa-
cility operability, and measurements to confirm
conditions consistent with long-term safety. The
latter includes shaft and tunnel stability, control
of drainage water, control of underground air con-
ditions, operability of waste handling and other
equipment, and radiological control. Monitoring
programmes must be designed and implemented
so as not to reduce the overall level of long term
safety.
In 1998, the IAEA established the Geological
Repository Safeguards Experts Group to provide
advice on safeguards technology development for
geological repositories and on implementing the
generic safeguards approach at specific facilities.
The pre-operational phase is defined to be the
period from designation, by a State, of a site for
construction of a geological repository for spent
fuel disposal up through receipt of the first dispos-
al container. The safeguards measures are pro-
posed in the report of the Geological Repository
Safeguards Experts Group (IAEA, 2003). In Fin-
land, the national expert group LOSKA, consult-
ing the national authority, reviewed these meas-
ures and considered a few of these techniques to
be suitable to be applied at the Olkiluoto site
(STUK-YTO-TR 199). During the pre-operational
phase the selected measures, techniques and pro-
cedures should be proven and efficient practices
developed.11
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3 Geographical site of
the Olkiluoto facilityThe excavation of the final disposal repository can
be regulated according to the national legislation.
In Finland the Nuclear Energy Act is modified to
adopt the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty (NPT) and its Additional Protocol,
INFCIRC/540. However, at present the modifica-
tions are not yet in force, since the INFCIRC/540
shall be ratified simultaneously in the European
Community, most probably during 2004. Anyhow,
the national system safeguarding the development
of the repository is suggested to follow these inter-
national requirements and obligations.
The gallery in the form of a research tunnel is
named Onkalo by the Implementer. This Under-
ground Rock Characterisation Facility (as named
by the Implementer) is located within the geologi-
cal research site at Olkiluoto, apart from the nucle-
ar power plants (Figure 2). These terminological
wordings are widely used in the geological society
but unfortunately they are inconsistent to those of
the Additional Protocol (AP), according to which
the facilities and sites are to be declared as the
Article 2 of the AP states that “Each State and the
Community (Euratom Safeguards) shall provide
the Agency (IAEA) with a declaration containing
the information identified in sub-paragraphs”.
The subparagraph, Article 2 a (iii) requires “A
general description of each building on each site,
including its use and, if not apparent form that
description, its contents. The description shall
include a map of the site.”
Site is defined in the Article 18b as follows:
“‘Site’ means that area delimited by the Com-
munity and a State in the relevant design infor-
mation for a facility, including a closed-down facil-
ity, and in the relevant information on a location
outside facilities where nuclear material is cus-
tomarily used, including a closed-down location
outside facilities where nuclear material was cus-
tomarily used (this is limited to locations with hot12cells or where activities related to conversion,
enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were
carried out). ‘Site’ shall also include all installa-
tions, co-located with the facility or location, for
the provision or use of essential services, includ-
ing: hot cells for processing irradiated materials
not containing nuclear material; installations for
the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and
buildings associated with specified activities iden-
tified by the State concerned under Article
2(a)(iv).” The Article 2a(iv) is a request to describe
the scale of operation for each location engaged in
the nuclear-related manufacturing specified in An-
nex I to the Protocol.
Moreover, ‘Facility’ means:
(i) a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a
fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an iso-
tope separation plant or a separate storage
installation, or
(ii)any location where nuclear material in
amounts greater than one effective kilogram is
customarily used.
The final disposal repository site at Olkiluoto shall
include several buildings that will serve in the
future as facility and also as “essential services for
the treatment, storage and disposal of waste”, if
spent fuel is considered as waste. The geographi-
cal site shall include the main encapsulation plant
(the future Facility, where one effective kilogram
is customarily used) and of a large underground
repository (the future Facility, as a separate stor-
age installation). The design of the sub-surface fa-
cilities will continue during the rock investiga-
tions, and the licensing procedure is scheduled to
take place in 2010–2012. In the preparatory phase,
an underground research gallery will be excavat-
ed. The final repository is planned to be linked to
this research gallery according to the research re-
sults. Moreover, the geographical or geometrical
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8siting of the repository may change also during
the operational phase.
The installations, i.e. buildings to facilitate the
underground repository shall be built in the land
area owned by TVO, co-located at the distance of a
few kilometres from the present NPPs. According
to the current Finnish legislation, underground
constructions are not included in the gross floor
area of the building on surface, thus the municipalFigure 2. The underground rock characterization laboratorcivil construction permit does not give restrictions
on construction of the underground research labo-
ratory. However, it is planned to be constructed
according the long-term safety assessment. It is
not straightforward that the development of this
underground space can be regulated and inspect-
ed as part of the “Nuclear Facility” or “Location
outside facilities” at the “site”. However, it is
“relevant to the development of nuclear fuel cycle13
y Onkalo to be excavated at Olkiluoto (Posiva Oy, 2003).
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8as approved by the appropriate authorities” and
thus considerable under the Article 2a(x).
According to the present Finnish legislation,
the plan to construct an underground rock charac-
terisation facility consisting of a ramp, tunnel and
shaft is not subjected to the Nuclear Energy Act.
However, the possibility of having this under-
ground space licensed to be a part of the reposi-
tory shall be considered already during the con-
struction phase. Also, the IAEA Policy Paper 15
also suggests that “The Agency, in collaboration
with the State, should establish all pertinent in-
formation about the original undisturbed site,
preferably before excavation begins, in order to
plan for safeguards measures. Attention should be
given to investigatory shafts or tunnel, which may
in some cases be excavated before the decision to
build a repository has been made.”
Therefore, the underground characterisation
and research programme with an extensive envi-
ronmental monitoring will be reviewed also by the
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. Owing to
the principle of public transparency, the main
drawings (Figure 2) and the scientific monitoring
programme are also published by the Implement-
er (Posiva 2003). Moreover, this geological,14hydro-geological and rock mechanical monitoring
and research programme can also be evaluated by
other independent scientists and the authorities,
and the monitoring results can, as applicable,
contribute to safeguards measures. Moreover, the
operator also willing to allow additional monitor-
ing instruments to be placed at the site, if consid-
ered to be necessarily. The independent verifica-
tion methodology can be defined in co-operation
with the operator and landowner.
Owing to the present conditions and develop-
ment with the repository, the FINSP invited the
IAEA and the Expert Group to visit the Olkiluoto
geographical site and provided the Agency with
pertinent information during the one-week sym-
posium held at Rauma Sept. 29 – Oct. 4, 2003.
Later, on November 18, the Director General of
STUK invited the IAEA to start negotiations con-
cerning the implementation of safeguards meas-
ures during the pre-operational phase of the final
repository. In this official letter, a summary pre-
senting the background material discussed at Rau-
ma was also submitted to the Agency. The safe-
guards criteria, as applicable, are to be fulfilled
already during the excavation of the first gallery
in 2004.
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4 Design and operational features of
the repository through out the lifetimeThe disposal facility will consist of the surface in-
stallation including the encapsulation plant and
the underground facilities. The nuclear spent fuel
canisters filled in the encapsulation plant are low-
ered in a lift or in a ramp to the underground final
disposal repository. The repository will consist of
tunnels excavated at a depth of hundreds of me-
ters at 25 m distance from each other. These repos-
itory tunnels are connected by transport tunnels
(Figure 3). Apart from the canister transfer shaft,
the facility is connected to the ground surface by a
personnel shaft and a working shaft, also a ramp
in under consideration and proposed for the re-
search tunnel of Onkalo. In general, the siting ofFigure 3. Generic layout of the disposal facility at
Olkiluoto (Posiva 2003).these facilities at the territory of Olkiluoto is not
yet designed. The principle is discussed below.
According to the Implementer’s present view
(Posiva Oy, web-site 2003):
“The final disposal canisters will be made of
nodular cast iron, enclosed in a watertight, 5 cm
thick copper shell. The canisters will be emplaced
in holes drilled at the bottom of the tunnels
excavated in the bedrock. The canisters will be
emplaced in holes drilled at the bottom of the
repository tunnels, spaced at a few meters from
each other. The canisters are then surrounded
with bentonite clay, which expands when it ab-
sorbs water. The clay not only prevents direct
water flow to the surface of the canister, but also
protects the canister against minor bedrock move-
ments. The rock isolates the fuel so that it can
never be harmful to the organic environment. By
emplacing the canisters deep in the bedrock, the
nuclear waste is isolated from any events taking
place on the ground surface. This also prevents
unintentional penetration by man into the final
disposal facility. The depth of the repository en-
sures sufficient isolation against e.g. turmoils
caused by future ice ages.
The bedrock protects the waste against exter-
nal influence, creates mechanically and chemically
stable conditions in the final disposal repository
and restricts the amount of water coming into
contact with the final disposal canisters. The re-
search results obtained so far indicate that
groundwater movement is minimal inside the rock
at a depth of hundreds of meters. The water is also
almost oxygen-free so that its corrosive influence
on both the canisters and the spent nuclear fuel is
negligent. If the spent fuel for some unforeseeable
reason should come into contact with the ground-
water, the materials dissolved from it would be
trapped in the bentonite and the bedrock round
the canisters.15
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8The bedrock will stop any possible radiation
emitted from the waste canister, but this is not the
primary reason for burying the nuclear waste in a
depth of several hundred meters: a solid rock
course of just of few meters would be enough to
dampen the radiation to the level of natural back-
ground radiation.
When the last canisters have been emplaced in
the repository, the encapsulation plant is decom-
missioned, the tunnels are filled with a mixture of
bentonite and crushed stone and the shafts lead-
ing to the repository are closed. The final disposal
repository will require no monitoring after it has
been decommissioned.
After decommissioning, the use of the land
above will in no way be restricted by the reposi-16tory tunnels. When in operation, the final disposal
facility will cover a ca 40 hectare land area. After
the facility has been closed, this land area can be
used for any purpose considered suitable.
In practice, the safety of the final disposal of
spent nuclear fuel is based on several technical
and natural release barriers which prevent and
slow down the release of radioactive materials
from the final disposal repository into the bedrock
and into the organic nature. These barriers in-
clude the solid state of the spent fuel, the double
construction of the final disposal canister and the
bentonite clay in which it is enclosed. The final
barrier is formed by hundreds of meters of rock
between the final disposal repository and the
organic nature” (Posiva Oy 2003).
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5 Site-specific general safeguards objectivesThe Olkiluoto area is located in western Finland
where the 1800–1900 million year old bedrock in
mainly composed of metasedimentary migmatic
mica gneisses. These gneisses are cut by granodi-
orite, coarse grained granites and granitic pegma-
tites. About 4 % of the area of the present Olkiluo-
to Island, where the NPPs and the disposal site
are located, is represented by outcrops of these
crystalline rocks, which are present everywhere at
a depth of a few meters. The thickness of the soil
cover varies, in general, between 2 and 7 meters,
the deepest depressions are 20 m deep. The
Olkiluoto area is flat; the highest point of the
Olkiluoto Island is 18 m above sea level. The ac-
cess tunnel to the Onkalo laboratory is proposed
to begin at one of the local rocky hills at the level
of 9–10 meters above the present sea level. There-
fore, all the activities related to the underground
facilities are taking place in the hard rock. The
excavation itself is going to be done using the clas-
sical drilling and blasting method. The ventilation
shafts will be first made by the raise boring tech-
nique and later slashed up to larger diameter us-
ing the drilling and blasting techniques.
The underground repository of operating waste
was excavated near the NPPs at Olkiluoto during
1988–1989. These caverns were sited in the even-
grained grey gneiss, also called tonalite owing to
its igneous-like texture. The mineralogy is the
same in tonalities and mica gneisses. This rock is
considered to be most stable one in Olkiluoto.
However, a few water-conductive fracture zones
were cut during the excavation. In general, an
average of 0.7–1.1 fractures per scan line meter
was encountered during the geological characteri-
sation of the tunnels. The majority of the fractures
were filled, kaolinite and chlorite are the most
common fracture infillings, but carbonates, sul-
phides, graphite and clayey mineral occur abun-
dantly. The same infilling are also present in thedeep boreholes cored to characterise the final
disposal site to a depth of 500 m. During the
construction of the repository of operating waste,
the mostly fractured intersections of the tonalitic
tunnel wall were reinforced using bolts and con-
crete. According to the geological investigations
most of the rock volume at Olkiluoto consists of
the more deformed mica gneiss. Therefore, most
tunnels and rock spaces of the deep repository
must be sited in the deformed rock in which more
grouting than in the tonalitic rock can be expect-
ed.
According to the plans, the access tunnel to the
Onkalo will advance 20–25 m in a week, and 1 km
in a year. The duration of the excavation of the
Onkalo will thus be 6–7 years. The tunnels and
the shaft will be reinforced by bolts, sprayed
concrete and possibly also steel mesh or cast
concrete structure reinforcements. In order to lim-
it groundwater ingress the tunnels will be pre-
grouted and post-grouted according to the results
of rock mechanical investigations. The methods
and the amount of reinforcement and grouting
will depend on local conditions, and may thus
change even within short distances along the
tunnel wall. This requires coordinated investiga-
tion, design and construction activities to recog-
nise the most suitable solutions in advance, and to
handle possible unexpected changes in the layout
of the Onkalo. The design information generation
and verification for safeguards purposes should
also be linked to this phase. The verification of the
progress in tunnelling should be carried out in
such a manner that the excavated volume can be
documented in concordance with the geological
investigations before the rock walls are reinforced.
After the reinforcement, the existence of any un-
declared voids is very difficult to prove without
disturbing the operational safety of the facility.
The possible existence of a clandestine tunnel17
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prove. There are several geophysical techniques
that are applicable to detects voids and openings
within the bedrock. However, the effectiveness of
these mainly active seismic or electromagnetic
methods depends on the size and distance of the
object. Also the physical parameters between the
void (water, air) and the host rock affect the
detection ability. The sounding frequency and oth-
er operator-dependent sounding parameters
should also be defined according to the (unknown)
target. These methods are applied to map the
water-bearing fractures in the bedrock. Based on
these results it can be assumed that the number
geophysical anomalies interpreted to originate
from unknown bedrock features between known
boreholes is rather high; in particular the conduc-
tive fracture infillings listed above will reflect
radar waves of any ground penetrating radar
instrument as already observed in the site charac-
terisation studies. Therefore, the direct mapping
of unexpected tunnels beyond the reinforced tun-
nel wall using geophysical techniques in the re-
pository will mainly generate fuzzy information
for the geological bedrock modelling. The origins
of all of anomalies can not be verified without
extensive drilling and coring.
The excavation of a clandestine tunnel will
introduce environmental effects that may be de-
tected indirect. In order to reach the depth of 500
m with a truck, a sloping tunnel is required.
Assuming the slope of 1:10 the length of the
tunnel must be at least of the order of 5 km, like
the ramp of the Onkalo. The tunnelling should be
carried out in an undetectable way. However, the
bedrock must be blasted; maybe a large coring18machine could be applied for tunnelling. Probably,
a large diameter drilling equipment could be ap-
plied for the direct access to the repository. These
activities introduce noise and vibrations that
might be detectable. The removed rock mass must
also be stored or hided somewhere. The mass
transfer will introduce activities that can be de-
tected. Moreover, the maintenance of a tunnel
needs electricity for drainage and ventilation,
which requires installations that are detectable.
Also the consequences of a tunnel would be ob-
served the hydrological monitoring of the reposi-
tory.
Until the construction of the Onkalo explorato-
ry gallery is initiated, the bedrock remains undis-
turbed except for the boreholes used for initial site
characterization, and the already ongoing prepar-
atory works related to removal of vegetation and
soil cover. The boreholes will be used also during
the monitoring of the effects of the excavation to
the natural conditions. Therefore, hydrogeological
and –chemical monitoring will take place during
the construction and operation period. Also, the
geophysical and geological site characterisation
programme will continue with the development of
the research tunnels. The proposed monitoring
programme (Posiva 2003) is addressed mainly to
long-term and operational safety during the con-
struction period of the Onkalo. Small enlarge-
ments to the proposed programme would give
signals also from rock masses and hydrological
condition also in the safeguards-relevant neigh-
bourhood of the Onkalo. Safeguards relevant fea-
tures of that procedure need to be identified and,
if necessary, additional elements of safeguards
relevance incorporated.
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6 Potential monitoring methods and
procedures for the Olkiluoto siteThe IAEA Programme for the Development of
Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in
Geological Repositories (SAGOR), comprising
eight Member State Support Programmes, Euro-
pean Commission, and IAEA was launched in
1988. Additional work was also undertaken by the
Canadian, German, Swedish and U.S. Safeguards
Support Programmes. These programmes per-
formed diversion path analyses for generic facility
geological repository designs and developed rec-
ommendations on IAEA safeguards requirements
and safeguards approaches. The generic safe-
guards approaches for operating and closed deep
geological repositories were defined in the IAEA
SAGOR report (STR-312, 1998). The generic safe-
guards approaches were defined more in detail by
the expert’s of the SAGOR group meeting in 2002
(STR-338, 2003). Before these approaches were de-
veloped and agreed, it was necessary to first de-
fine the model repository. This definition remains
valid and is provided here for information.
6.1 Model geological repository
The model geological repository has a large number
of excavated vaults, or disposal galleries, access
tunnels to the vaults, shafts for surface access and
ventilation, access ramps or drifts and various sur-
face facilities to service the repository. It is as-
sumed that several disposal vaults would be exca-
vated and prepared for use prior to the receipt of
the first waste package. It was also assumed that
excavation would continue whilst waste packages
were emplaced elsewhere within the facility.
The primary safeguards objective is to ensure
that no diversion or reprocessing of nuclear mate-
rial takes place undetected from the time the
material arrives in the repository until the closure
and sealing of the repository facilities. The spent
fuel will arrive on site in sealed containers from a
spent fuel conditioning and encapsulation facility.The safeguards requirements are based primarily
on the need to maintain ‘continuity of knowledge’
(CoK) on the nuclear material items. The recom-
mended safeguards approach will be to use item
accounting supported by a reliable and compre-
hensive containment and surveillance (C/S) sys-
tem above ground to verify, inter alia, the transfer
and flow of spent fuel containers. Design informa-
tion verification (DIV) is the recommended prima-
ry safeguards measure in the underground areas
of the facility. DIV in this instance could include
geophysical techniques. Working in combination,
C/S and DIV will contribute towards CoK.
The SAGOR Programme assumed that the
model repository would have an operating lifetime
in the region of 40–50 years. After the last waste
container is received and emplaced there is likely
to be a period of several years during which time
the evolution of the facility is closely monitored.
This period will provide assurance that systems
continue to operate as expected – systems in this
context refer to both ‘man-made’ mechanical and
‘natural’ geological/near-field systems. This period
will be the precursor to active decommissioning
operations that will include both surface and un-
derground facilities. Backfilling of the emplace-
ment vaults and access tunnels is expected to take
place at some time when there is sufficient confi-
dence in the facility. During the closure period
following backfilling of all drifts, tunnels, shafts,
boreholes and surface facilities, certain equipment
will remain in place in order to provide a monitor-
ing role for a period of time until the regulatory
authorities deem there is no further requirement.
At this time, the safeguard measures applied will
necessarily be refocused in order to give assurance
that nuclear material is not being removed for
non-peaceful purposes. The role of geophysical
(e.g., passive seismic) methods, environmental
sampling, and satellite and aerial surveillance19
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will be part of an active inspection programme
intended to detect undeclared operations that may
be used as a means for gaining access to the
nuclear materials.
It should be noted that to be entirely successful
the safeguards approach will have to be dynamic.
That is to say it will require regular review and
modification in order to meet changing circum-
stances. Operator, State and Inspection Authority
liaison will be a pre-requisite in order to imple-
ment an effective and demonstrable safeguards
system that meets the safety goals of the reposi-
tory. The measures applied will also clearly change
throughout the lifetime of the repository (con-
struction, operation, post-operational phase and
post-closure).
The diversion paths identified for the model
repository include the removal of spent fuel canis-
ters or containers from above and below ground,
through various routes. It is expected that a po-
tential diverter would consider associated activi-
ties, such as substitution, to either conceal or
delay detection.
The safeguards approach will depend on the
adopted disposal concept (e.g., immediate backfill-
ing or repository kept open until final closure).
Because of the undesirability of returning and
opening a canister containing irradiated nuclear
materials and the inaccessibility of emplaced can-
isters for verification of any description (either
canister identification or radiological inventory), a
very high degree of reliability is needed in the
safeguards system. This will be achieved by the
use of intrinsically reliable systems with multiple
redundancy. The safeguards approach may be as
follows. The containment and surveillance system
at repository openings may be an integrated sys-
tem of motion and radiation detectors, optical
surveillance and safeguards seals. These will be
designed for independent operation and with the
ability to provide remote monitoring/analysis of
authenticated signals. These systems may reduce
the presence of inspectors on the site. The inten-
tion will be to provide the inspection authority
with a high level of assurance that filled casks
received at the surface of the repository are trans-
ferred underground to the emplacement vaults
without tampering. All potential access points to
the repository would be rigorously monitored to20ensure that no undeclared items leave or enter the
underground facilities.
Design information verification would be peri-
odically implemented to provide assurance that
the physical structure and operations of the repos-
itory were consistent with the plans and pro-
gramme of activities supplied by the State author-
ity to the inspection authority. If necessary, geo-
physical techniques might be employed as a means
of supporting DIV activities as well as optical
surveillance. Additional safeguards measures are
possible depending on the precise construction of
the facility. Environmental sampling in the reposi-
tory is also being considered.
6.2 Olkiluoto repository
The construction and operational features of the
Olkiluoto repository are described in chapters 3
and 4. The IAEA Expert Group visited the existing
and operating underground repositories as well
the site selected for the repository of spent fuel in
2003. The Group formulated a set of recommenda-
tions how to proceed with the development of pos-
sible safeguards approaches. The suitability of the
proposed geophysical methods, environmental
sampling, and satellite and aerial surveillance
techniques was discussed with respect to the natu-
ral conditions of the Olkiluoto area. The inspection
regime and timely evaluation process should be by
the key elements of the approach to be established.
The Olkiluoto rock characterisation tunnels
are planned to be excavated in the well-investigat-
ed area of approximately 1 km2. The geological
characterisation of the geographical site is based
mainly on more than 25 boreholes drilled for the
site characterization at the repository depth. This
Onkalo site will be actively monitored during the
construction phase using observations and sam-
pling carried out with the aid of the boreholes and
direct observations in the sub-surface. This near
field monitoring covers an area of 5 km2; whereas,
the remote operated geophysical and satellite
methods can be addressed to a larger area. Con-
sidering the possible construction of a sloping
tunnel with the slope of 1:10, requested for the
heavy transport vehicles, the activities should be
monitored within the distance of at least 5 km
around the repository. The expert group consid-
ered the radius of 10 km to be reasonable for
monitoring.
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Earth observation techniques are one tool to moni-
tor a repository. Using earth observation from sat-
ellites, activities and changes on surface can be
monitored. The most suitable targets for earth ob-
servation include monitoring of building and road
construction activities and quarrying. The devel-
opment in the site can be monitored in a straight-
forward manner by overlaying images from differ-
ent dates. Change events can be accurately locat-
ed. Also different image types can be overlaid with
each other, e.g. optical imagery and synthetic aper-
ture radar (SAR) imagery. The images can also be
overlaid on map databases. Archived images can
be easily reanalyzed.
Although the earth observation techniques are
widely used, also by the IAEA, a site cannot be
continuously monitored. For instance, the frequen-
cy of data acquisition using space-borne or air-
borne imaging is too low to monitor ground traffic.
Optical satellite data cannot be acquired through
cloud or nighttime. During winter image quality is
often poor also during clear days due to long
shadows and low intensity of reflected radiation.
Snow cover makes automatic image analysis more
difficult particularly when only part of the ground
is snow-covered during autumn or spring. The
geographical location of Olkiluoto at 62 latitude
and the four seasons, introduce these limitation to
be considered.
The earth observation techniques can be ap-
plied as an unannounced control technique. If the
repository site is monitored using earth observa-
tion only once a year or less frequently, and if
there is a flexibility in the selection of acquisition
time, optical satellite data with sub-meter resolu-
tion is the best and possibly an adequate alterna-
tive. If more frequent image acquisition is desired
the monitoring should involve using synthetic
aperture radar (SAR) that can acquire imagery
under all weather conditions during all seasons.
Within the coming five years, space-borne SAR
data with few meters resolution will be available.
6.3 Radiological Monitoring
Radiological monitoring is a key tool that provides
assurance to authorities and the local community
that nuclear facilities are being safely operated. It
is a well understood technology with a large ex-
pert base. Radiological monitoring is been carriedout remotely by installed devices or by collecting
samples during site visits. The environmental
monitoring at Olkiluoto is carried out by STUK
already before of the operation of the NPPs begun.
This monitoring gives a reasonable background, or
baseline for comparisons while monitoring the
chances introduced by the future operations in
Olkiluoto.
Any attempt at re-processing within the reposi-
tory will release both particulate and volatile
radionuclides. Particulate is likely to be contained
by HEPA filters, but detectable amounts of vola-
tile isotopes could escape from the hot cell and
leave the repository in exhaust air or in wastewa-
ter. Small quantities of volatile radionuclides
would also be released if a used fuel canister were
opened within the repository. Therefore, the radio-
logical monitoring can be suggested to be carried
out at the repository site and in the future also
within the disposal facilities.
In addition, naturally occurring radionuclides
are encountered also at Olkiluoto; particularly in
granite and clay, elements in the 238U series and
also 40K are common. 226Radium decays to radon
gas, which is commonly encountered in Finland,
also at the present Olkiluoto facilities. New exca-
vation can lead to a significant release of radon.
Any radon anomaly might be associated with new
excavation.
6.4 Geophysical sounding and
monitoring
Geophysical techniques are typically developed to
measure physical rock properties and to detect
chances (i.e. geophysical anomalies) in these as
well as to map continuing interfaces in the subsur-
face. The measured readings and especially the
anomalies are later related to changes in rock
properties using different types of inversion tech-
niques. The geophysical techniques can be divided
in two main categories, those requiring active trig-
gering of the geophysical primary field (sounding)
and those based on the passive monitoring the
geophysical field.
Typically, the geophysical techniques are ap-
plied in such a manner that the expected features
should introduce the expected anomaly; which is
target in field surveys. The observed anomaly is
later analysed using software and finally quanti-
fied in terms of rock properties. Therefore, the21
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8active methods require skilled personnel to select
the sensitive instruments and to operate them
manually or automatically. Even within one tech-
nique there are instrument properties (e.g. source
and recording frequencies, recording parameters)
and the operator dependent factors (selected sen-
sor locations, sounding frequencies, gaining func-
tions in recording and processing, etc.) which af-
fect the results. Moreover, the processing of the
recorded data needs professionals. Typically, the
geophysical data need to be processed and ana-
lysed after the field work. The analysis, often
called interpretation procedure, commonly re-
quires also the presence of the end-users, often
geologists who have given the particular target for
the field survey.
The commercial use of the geophysical tech-
niques in the hard rock environment is mainly
within the mining industry. Some of the methods
are also used to locate water-bearing features in
rock. These methods are sensitive also to voids in
rock mass and therefore can be used for safe-
guards purposes. A void in rock can be located
using several methods and by combining the re-
sults of several inversion processes. The most
relevant geophysical methods (gravity, seismic,
electromagnetic) are based on the difference in
physical properties of water or air in contract to
intact rock. Those methods identified to have safe-
guards relevance are described in the SAGOR-
reports. However, the theoretical detectability of
any object depends on the size of the object and on
the distance to the object and the difference in the
physical properties in reference to the selected
technique. Therefore, the suggested methods
should be analysed with reference to the physical
rock properties observed during the site character-
ization of Olkiluoto. Owing to this experience the
applicable methods must be proven for safeguards
implementation.
6.4.1 Passive Seismic
Passive seismic monitoring can be carried out at
various frequencies. Short period (0–50 Hz) seis-
mic monitoring is often carried out by national
authorities to monitor natural seismicity. Micro-
seismic monitoring (1–500 Hz) is used to monitor
rock stress during intensive mining. Continuous
passive seismic monitoring is likely method for22the detection of excavations that introduce vibra-
tion in the bedrock.
At Olkiluoto, the current passive monitoring
includes the temporary installation of short period
seismometers at the distance of 5–10 km from the
suggested repository. The applicability of these
sensors and the recording technique will be ana-
lysed in the following Chapter. Moreover, six short
period accelerometers have been installed by the
Operator (Posiva) at the repository site for rock
mechanical evaluations. Also this data is available
for the safeguards purposes.
6.4.2 Active seismic
Various active seismic methods could, in theory, be
used to image the sub-surface. The refraction seis-
mic surveying is applied to map the depth–to–
bedrock profiles and to map seismic velocities at
the rock surface. The common reflection seismic
surveying, which directly produces profiles of the
sub-surface, is not an effective technique in crys-
talline rock due to unpredictable reflectors in the
rock mass and the rocky and uneven overburden,
which provides poor acoustic coupling for the tech-
nique. However, reflection analysis has been ap-
plied to the Vertical Seismic Profiling (VSP) which
is being carried out using surface sources and
borehole receivers. This data are being used to
establish detailed geological knowledge of reflect-
ing features, proposed to present water-bearing
fractures of zones of weak rock near the proposed
repository volume. This method is of value in de-
termining geological details of the site to be devel-
oped and will be used by the operator for that
purpose. However, most probably it would not be
capable of sufficient resolution at the depth being
considered for the repository to be capable of de-
tecting and identifying undeclared tunneling or
cavities. The same conclusion can be made for the
other seismic sounding techniques applied from
the ground surface.
6.4.3 Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR)
The application of the Ground Penetrating Radar
(GPR) is based on the reflectivity of the interfaces
at which there is change in the permittivity in the
subsurface. Owing to the different electrical prop-
erties of soil and rock; water, air and other filling
material at fracture surfaces in the rock mass the
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reflectors.
Similar to the active seismic method, the GPR
has been applied from the surface and from bore-
holes for rock characterisation purposes. The GPR
method has reveal several fractured bedrock sec-
tions owing to the good reflectivity at conductive
(sulphide-, graphite-, and water-) filled fracture
surfaces near the ground surface or near the
boreholes. The average fracture frequency is of the
order of 1 fracture/m along the boreholes, and
geological control is available only at those anom-
alies intersected by the borehole. Moreover, the
borehole radar is blind to the very near zone
around the borehole. There are also conductive
mineral with the rock mass, making the interpre-
tation even more complicated. In addition, the
range of the method is limited from several tens of
meters to 10 - 15 m owing to the high salinity of
the ground water in the deep bedrock. The high
conductivity of the water also tones down the
anomalies. Owing to this limitation and the fuzzy
number of reflectors the method is not applied
systematically in the rock characterisation pro-
gramme.
In safeguarding the repository tunnels, Ground
Penetrating Radar (GPR) will record reflections
also from cavities within a short distance of a rock
face as reflectors. The potential role for GPR is in
design information verification (DIV), in particu-
lar revealing undeclared cavities or tunnels. How-
ever, it should be noted that GPR performance will
depend on the physical properties of the host rock
and the radar equipment, antenna frequencies
and operator-dependent recording parametersused. It will be obvious that a reflection originat-
ing from a void is difficult to be identified from a
reflection originating from a geological boundary.
However, repeated GPR surveys could be used for
the detection of undeclared voids in different parts
of the future repository and to provide confidence
that no undeclared voids are in the vicinity. For
the monitoring, a GPR baseline data set should be
collected and stored for the further analysis dur-
ing the excavation of the repository, since the
reference is the geology with the sources of the
anomalies around the declared repository design.
During the monitoring and analysis of the anoma-
lies the records should be compared owing to the
equipment used and persons responsible for the
operation, processing and interpretation of
records. Therefore, there will be development
tasks for the technique before it can be recom-
mended to be used as a proven technique in
safeguarding the Olkiluoto repository.
6.4.4 Electromagnetic and electrical methods
There are a variety of methods for measuring the
electrical properties of the sub-surface. Electro-
magnetic and electrical methods may be used in
site evaluation to determine conductivity at depth,
which in turn is used to assist in the development
of a hydrological model for the repository owing to
variations in the groundwater salinity. Although
electromagnetic/electrical techniques could be
used for detecting both non-conducting areas such
as open air-filled tunnels and conductors such as
rails and electrical wires or the saline water-filled
voids, these techniques cannot be thought to be
practical for safeguards purposes.23
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7 Methodology and procedures for safeguards
measures at Olkiluoto repository siteAccording to the recommendations for the pre-op-
erational phase of the repository generated in the
Programme for Development of Safeguards for Fi-
nal Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositor-
ies, the role of geophysical methods, environmen-
tal sampling, and satellite and aerial surveillance
techniques will become more prominent in the
IAEA safeguards. Moreover, it is recommended to
generate the baseline of natural conditions before
the excavation work begins. Safeguards require-
ments should be integrated into the repository de-
sign at an early stage in order to establish func-
tional, non-intrusive, and cost-effective safeguards
measures.
The investigations for the site characterisation
at Olkiluoto proceed to the underground phase in
2004. According to the site characterisation inves-
tigations carried out from the ground level and
from boreholes during last 20 years, the natural
conditions are documented and the design of the
underground facilities is carried out by the imple-
menter (Posiva 2003). The excavation of the un-
derground rooms and tunnels for bedrock charac-
terisation at repository site is scheduled to begin
in 2004. Therefore, the preliminary excavation
related procedures; i.e., the cleaning of the rock
surface with the removal of vegetation and soil
cover near the Onkalo begun in 2003.
The main task for safeguards is to observe the
development of the underground space, which can
be called as Design Information Verification, and
the creation of the credible assurance of the ab-
sence of the unannounced activities near the re-
pository site. The Finnish national system of safe-
guards will consist of field audits and review of
the progress in tunneling works and site charac-
terisation. The safeguards-related obligations will
be focused on these procedures. Some additional
information may be collected using independent
surveillance or monitoring techniques. The nation-24al system will assist the IAEA to enable the
efficient and cost-effective safeguards for the
Olkiluoto repository site.
7.1 Monitoring of the Olkiluoto area
for long-term safety assessment
The development of the Onkalo will be based on
coordinated investigations, design and construc-
tion activities. Pilot holes will be drilled and cored
along the tunnel profile as the excavation pro-
ceeds and investigations will be out for geological,
rock mechanical, hydrogeological and hydrogeo-
chemical characterisation. In addition, monitoring
is planned at the ground surface, in boreholes
drilled from ground surface, in boreholes drilled
from Onkalo and in Onkalo itself. The information
collected for characterisation and monitoring by
independent qualified subcontractors will be as-
sessed in an integrated modelling. The aim of this
modelling is both to successively enhance the de-
scription and understanding of the rock volume
around Onkalo and to assess potential impacts of
the construction and operation of Onkalo (Posiva
2003). Integration between monitoring and model-
ling in different scientific disciplines, including
safeguards aspects, is essential during the devel-
opment of the Onkalo.
The characterisation programme is carried out
to update and increase confidence in the descrip-
tive model of Olkiluoto bedrock in such a manner
to that it will serve the needs of the preliminary
safety assessment report required in the construc-
tion licence application. During the characterisa-
tion programme new techniques to characterise
volumes of rock from the underground will be
developed and demonstrated. Moreover, the rock
volumes that could be suitable for housing the
final repository will be identified. The characteri-
sation programme will be followed continuously
and reviewed in 3 year intervals by the national
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guards relevance of the observations.
7.2 Remote sensing of the Olkiluoto site
The technology of satellite imagery is well proven
and has been used by the military community for
many years. There are a number of sensor systems
available giving users the ability to remotely ob-
serve earth based objects in all weathers and con-
ditions. From 1991 onwards, the IAEA recognised
the potential of using commercially available sat-
ellite imagery to support their safeguards activi-
ties. A principal objective being to verify and mon-
itor the activities at declared nuclear facilities.
The increase in the use of satellite imagery has
resulted in several national programmes to con-
struct and launch satellites equipped with a wide
range of sensors and to subsequently make the
imagery available. Therefore, there are a number
of sources from which imagery can be obtained.
The IAEA has used several suppliers in order to
have independent and thus non-manipulated im-
ages for its unannounced surveillance and inspec-
tion procedures. Similarly, within the Finnish Sup-
port Programme the earth observation techniques
are reviewed and “zero-point” imagery at Olkiluo-
to is processed in 2003, i.e., at the stage before of
the scheduled construction of the underground
facilities. The satellite imagery is related to the
observation of the ground surface (Häme et al.
2004). Therefore, the method can be applied to
indirectly to locate mining activities, owing to new
installations, traffic routes and waste rock areas.
Also changes in water tables or in vegetation can
be observed as indicators of underground activi-
ties, but the excavated rock volumes can not be
estimated at the scale of an undeclared room
within the underground gallery.
Optical satellite data with sub-meter resolu-
tion is the best and possibly an adequate alterna-
tive in earth observation if there is flexibility in
the selection of acquisition time. If more frequent
image acquisition is desired the monitoring should
involve using synthetic aperture radar (SAR) that
can acquire imagery under all weather conditions
during all seasons. Particularly in Finland and
other northern and/or cloudy regions the signifi-
cance of the SAR imaging is emphasized to ensure
image acquisition from a desired instant of time.
Present SAR instruments offer imagery with ap-proximately ten meters resolution at best but not
later than the year 2006 SAR data with a couple of
meters resolution should be available.
It was considered important that the baseline
data include the same data types that are possibly
utilized later in continuous monitoring and in the
possible emergency surveys. Therefore also SAR
data from the Olkiluoto site has been ordered.
Until January 2004 four SAR images of from the
five ordered are available. Also, three different
optical images are acquired for the baseline data-
base. The best image type for close-up site moni-
toring is either the panchromatic image alone or a
fusion of the panchromatic data of 0.6-meter reso-
lution and multi-spectral data of 2.4-meter resolu-
tion (Figure 4). The practice will show whether
inclusion of the multi-spectral data is worth the
increased costs.
The SAR images matched with each other and
with the topographic map generally well. In some
cases the images suggest that the map, purchased
to serve a reference, may have some inaccuracies.
Use of the coordinate information in the SAR
images resulted in an approximately 20-meter
shift from the map after the geo-coding. The shift
was corrected using manually selected tie points
from the maps and images. The SAR data alone
are rather difficult to interpret due to the speckle
noise and due to low resolution. The major build-
ings have very high intensities and are thus strik-
ing in the image. Also some other objects with
high conductivity are distinct. However, dull col-
ours on land in the image that has been combined
from the four original SAR images indicate that
between the SAR image acquisitions there has
been hardly any such changes in the Olkiluoto
area that would have been detectable using SAR
instrument (Figure 5).
7.3 Geophysical monitoring at Olkiluoto
A wide range of geophysical techniques are
planned to be applied to generate raw data for the
site characterization of Olkiluoto. The data will be
interpreted for the geological characterization of
the bedrock and especially for the location and
characterisation of zones of mechanical or hydro-
logical interest in the safety assessment. These
interpretations will also be reviewed for their safe-
guards- relevancy. However, the rock mechanical
monitoring will give the most safeguards-relevant25
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8information. The excavation-introduced seismicity
will be studied using a net work of micro-seismic
stations at the investigation site. These seismic
observations are then inversed to estimate their
source locations in the bedrock volume. The blast-
ing, i.e., the explosions shot to proceed with the
tunnels are also recorded with this seismic net-
work operated by the subcontractor of the implem-
eter, Posiva Oy. The interpretations are also re-
viewed by the national authority, STUK.
The Institute of Seismology operates a network
of long-period seismic stations in Finland. The26
Figure 4. Combination of QuickBird multi-spectral
image sharpened with the panchromatic channel from
the geographical location of Onkalo. This image
(September 9, 2002) includes the near infrared spectral
band, which causes light colour of broad-leaved tree
forest.
Figure 5. Combination of the four ASAR images from
Olkiluoto environments. Colour codes: Red – temporal
mean amplitude of four images; Green – mean spatial
texture of four images; Blue – temporal variability
between four images.nearest station is located at the distance of 200 km
to the northeast from the Olkiluoto site. However,
the station together with the network is used for
the seismicity analysis at Olkiluoto. Since the
earthquake activity in the Precambrian rocks is
very low, the seismic data reveal mainly seismic
noise that can be also be related to diurnal activi-
ties and to construction activities (STUK 2003).
These seismic patterns will improve when the new
station at Laitila, only 50 km apart from the
Olkiluoto site, will be installed.
In addition, a temporary set of local short
period seismic stations was set up by the Institute
of Seismology around the Olkiluoto facilities in
2003. Two stations are located at different azi-
muths at a distance of approximately 5 km from
the planned repository, and one station is refer-
enced to one of the micro-seismic stations near the
cored borehole OL1 at the geological site. At the
stations there are Teledyne-Geotech S13 SP and
Lennarz 3C seismometers with a sensitivity of
1630 Vs/m and 400 Vs/m, respectively. The data
100 samples/second and 120 dB dynamic range, 6–
9 GB of HD space) are stored with DAS98 data
loggers. The hard disks are changed bimonthly.
The first records present the noise level near
the Olkiluoto site (Heikkinen & Tarvainen, 2003).
It is worth to point out that the station at the site
records the highest level of temporary noise, most
probably introduced by the power plants and re-
lated activities including also traffic to the
Olkiluoto harbour (Figure 6). The vibrations peaks
at 6.1–6.6 Hz are due to the power plants. The
reduced noise level before noon is due to mainte-
nance work reported at the power plant. In the
remote sensor at Kuivalahti, located 5 km to the
northwest from the site, only traffic noise can be
observed (Figure 7). The working hours with the
peaks at the morning rush hours and lunch time
can also recognised. The recording scheduled to
continue over the starting point of the excavation
works for the repository in mid-summer 2004. The
records will be analysed for their safeguards-
relevancy in 2004.
7.4 Radiological monitoring
The radioecological background monitoring at
Olkiluoto is carried out by STUK since 1972, and
environmental monitoring in 1977, one year be-
fore the operation of the NPPs begun. This moni-
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8toring gives a reasonable background, or baseline
for comparisons while monitoring the chances in-
troduced by the future operations in Olkiluoto or
elsewhere in the world. The present baseline con-
tains information related to the global fallout in-
cluding the Chernobyl accident.
The underground tunnels will be monitored for
operational health purposes; in particular, radonFigure 6. Daily noise level variations in Olkiluoto (OL1) on 
Figure 7. Daily noise level variations Kuivalahti 5 km part fcan be assumed to be present in the facilities. The
procedures and isotopes to be monitored for safe-
guards were reviewed in 2003. However, the Safe-
guards-related radiological monitoring is not con-
sidered to be relevant before the movement of
nuclear material is moved to the facility to be
constructed. Before that time, a new site-specific
baseline data can be acquired.27
Monday August 25th 2003.
rom Olkiluoto on Monday, August 25th 2003.
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8 SummaryThe final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the geo-
logical repository at Olkiluoto was accepted be the
local municipality, State authorities, and finally
endorsed by the Parliament of Finland in 2001.
The site investigations are proceeding to the un-
derground phase in 2004 when the excavation of
the tunnel system for bedrock characterisation at
repository site begins. Referring to the recommen-
dations generated in the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency’s Programme for Development of
Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in
Geological Repositories, the safeguards approach
for the pre-operational phase at Olkiluoto site is
suggested. At this phase the main obligation is to
be ensured about the absence of undeclared activi-
ties at or near the repository and during the exca-
vation of the investigatory galleries the verifica-
tion of the excavated rock space and its geometri-
cal volume.
The Olkiluoto repository will be located in the
1800–1900 million year old crystalline rock. All
underground excavation works is this hard rock
must be carried out using drilling methods. There-
fore, the safeguards-relevant monitoring can be
focused on mining introduced vibration analysis
and to mining-related activities. The passive seis-
mic monitoring and remote sensing techniques are
suggested for these purposes. Both methods give
indications on the activities near or at the reposi-
tory. In addition, the hydrological monitoring near
the site will give signals as unexpected changes in
water pressure or chemistry due to unknown
openings in the rock volume. Earth observation
techniques can also reveal phenomena related to
mining and quarrying activities, owing to second-
ary phenomena, e.g., changes in water tables or
mass transports, construction of buildings etc.
However, these methods are insensitive to the
amount of rock volume excavated or to the volume
underground space developed.28The design information generation and verifi-
cation for safeguards purposes should be incorpo-
rated to the progress in tunnelling and to the
geological mapping of the tunnel walls. The tun-
nels and the shaft will be reinforced by bolts,
sprayed concrete, grouting and possibly also steel
mesh or cast concrete structure reinforcements
according to the results of rock mechanical inves-
tigations. The verification of the progress in tun-
nelling should be carried out in such a manner
that the excavated volume can be documented in
concordance with the geological investigations be-
fore the rock walls are reinforced. After the rein-
forcement, the existence of any undeclared voids is
very difficult to prove without disturbing the oper-
ational safety of the underground gallery and
later, that of the facility.
Geophysical soundings at the site characterisa-
tion phase have shown that in the bedrock of
Olkiluoto there are features that introduce anom-
alies in the measurements. The observation capa-
bilities and the interpretation of the anomalies
and their source location vary owing to the tech-
nology, parameters and operating personnel. Most
of the anomalies are related to hydraulically and
mechanically anomalous bedrock features. Dense-
ly fractured zones introduce the main anomalies
to the present geophysical techniques. The mica
gneiss at Olkiluoto contains fractures at the aver-
age spacing of 0.7–1.1 m. Most of these contain
infillings that may be electrically conductive
therefore observable as anomalies also beyond the
reinforced tunnel wall, also the reinforcement it-
self will introduce anomalies. The future re-as-
sessment of these observations using some future
techniques may improve the geological knowledge
about the site, but the safeguards-relevant proce-
dures are, most likely, to be integrated with the
construction procedures.
The pre-operational phase of the Olkiluoto re-
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8pository should be efficiently used by the parties
involved in safeguards. The applicability and reli-
ability of the potential new techniques and the
efficient practices must be developed and proven
before their implementation as safeguards meas-
ures to be applied at the subsequent stages of the
repository development. In addition, practical im-plementation of safeguards measures needs to be
applied already before the first excavations and
blasting operations and parallel to the under-
ground gallery development. The national ap-
proach is based on three independent monitoring
systems that are in parallel operation already one
year before the excavation is scheduled.29
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 8
ReferencesHäme, T., Rautakorpi, S. & Ahola, H., 2004. Base-
line survey of the Olkiluoto nuclear waste reposi-
tory site using earth observation. VTT Informa-
tion Technology, Research Report TTE1-2004-5,
14 p.
Heikkinen P. & Tarvainen, M., 2003. Seismic net-
work around Olkiluoto - Establishing and the first
results. Presentation at IAEA Expert Group Meet-
ing, Rauma, Sept. 29 – Oct. 4, 2004.
IAEA, 1997. Safeguards for the final disposal of
spent fuel in geological repositories. STR-312. 5
Volumes.
IAEA, 1998.Safeguards for final diposal of spent
fuel in geological repositories. Safeguards Policy
Series 15. IAEA Safeguards Manual, pp. 77–84.30IAEA, 2003. Report of the experts meeting on
interface Iisues and interaction between safe-
guards and radioactive waste management in the
context of geological repositories. STR-338. 27 p.
Okko, O. (ed.) 2003. Safeguards for final disposal
of spent fuel. Methods and technologies for the
Olkiluoto site. STUK-YTO-TR 199. Helsinki, 2003.
Posiva Oy, 2003. Baseline conditions at Olkiluoto.
Posiva 2003-02, Preprint 220 p.
Posiva Oy, 2003. ONKALO, Underground charac-
terisation and research programme (UCRP). Posi-
va 2003-03, Preprint 142 p.
Posiva Oy, 2003. ONKALO, Underground rock
characterisation facility – main drawings stage.
Posiva Working Report 2003-26, Preprint 71 p.
